SOMALI YOUTH FOR PEACE

Monday, December 3, 2012

Monday
December 3, 2012

Opinion

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By MAKAU MUTUA
Posted Saturday, December 1 2012 at 20:00

In Summary

There’s no love lost between Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and Eldoret North MP William Ruto
If you believe the International Criminal Court, the two went at each other hammer and tongs in 2008
How can you have a “political union” where there’s no master and servant?
Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto must contend with “their respective tribal constituencies”. There’s growing evidence that Mr Ruto may not hold onto the Kalenjin, especially if he plays second fiddle to Mr Kenyatta
I can see why Mr Kenyatta sees a Uhuru-Ruto ticket as a plausible strategy out of the ICC and a roadblock against an Odinga presidency

A “political merger” of TNA and URP is nonsense on stilts. It won’t take a step without collapsing into a heap. That’s because oil and vinegar don’t mix. Let’s call a spade by its name.

There’s no love lost between Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and Eldoret North MP William Ruto.

If you believe the International Criminal Court, the two went at each other hammer and tongs in 2008.

Don’t be fooled that the wily and cunning Mr Ruto will be Mr Kenyatta’s bride.

Nor should you expect the brash Mr Kenyatta to prostrate himself before Mr Ruto.

Which begs the question – how can you have a “political union” where there’s no master and servant? That because you can’t.

The weird courtship between Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto is grounded on two mortal “fears” – the fear of the ICC and the fear of PM Raila Odinga.

A paradox

They’ve formed a pact because the ICC accuses them of masterminding the violence targeting “each other’s people” in 2008.

This is a paradox – but one I can explain. The violence wasn’t personal to either Mr Kenyatta or Mr Ruto.

The true objective wasn’t to attack people but to capture, or retain power. That’s how poor people are sacrificed by political elites every election cycle. It’s nothing personal. That’s how Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto can still come together to seek the highest office in the land.

For Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto, the fear of the ICC looms larger than the fate of the 1,300 dead, the IDPs, and the survivors.

The prospect of spending decades in a cold prison in Europe is a horrifying probability. Misery loves company. That’s why Mr Ruto and Mr Kenyatta are locked in an uncomfortable embrace.

They are probably the only two people who truly understand each other’s pain. They must spend sleepless nights – breaking out in cold sweats – in terrible nightmares.

They’ll do anything to save elves, including probably refusing to show up for trial at The Hague. That’s why they must win the election if they want to defy the ICC – like Sudan President Omar al-Bashir.

Mr Odinga is the second “fear” which unites Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto. This is a fear of “payback”. The Kenyattas and the Odingas have had a long running political feud.

Mzee Kenyatta turned on Jaramogi, Mr Odinga’s father, even though the latter refused a British offer to become Prime Minister in place of the former. Mzee Kenyatta later detained Mr Odinga.

In 2002, Mr Odinga led a rebellion in Kanu that denied Mr Kenyatta the presidency. In 2007, Mr Kenyatta joined President Kibaki to deny Mr Odinga the State House.

Mr Ruto fell out with Mr Odinga and left ODM. The two – Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto – have vowed to end Mr Odinga’s quest for the State House.

Mr Kenyatta isn’t just driven by vanity to seek the presidency. He’s now the head of an ideological faction – political conservatives – that’s ruled Kenya since independence. He – and this elite – want to safeguard their patrimony.

Many of them fear that Mr Odinga would scrutinise how their wealth – including land – was acquired.

There should be no doubt that many of those who plundered the country under Mzee Kenyatta, Mr Moi, and President Kibaki should be held to account.

Who knows whether Mr Odinga would do it, but they don’t want to wait and find out.

They’ve demonised Mr Odinga by falsely claiming he orchestrated the ICC against them. But fear isn’t enough to unite Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto.

Tribal constituencies

Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto must contend with “their respective tribal constituencies”. There’s growing evidence that Mr Ruto may not hold onto the Kalenjin, especially if he plays second fiddle to Mr Kenyatta.

The Kalenjin wonder why the Kikuyu can’t support “their son” instead. Perhaps the Kalenjin are aware of one important historical fact – the House of Mumbi has never supported a non-Kikuyu presidential candidate.

The Kalenjin can take this to the bank – Mr Ruto won’t be the first “outsider” candidate to win Kikuyu support.

Mr Ruto can only join Mr Kenyatta as the subordinate, not the other way round. And the Kikuyu will completely desert Mr Kenyatta in droves if he subordinates himself to Mr Ruto.

The risk for Mr Ruto – if he becomes Mr Kenyatta’s sidekick – is loss of face among the Kalenjin. This opens the door wide for Mr Odinga to scoop up Kalenjin voters.

It will also strengthen the hand of two key regional players – Industrialisation minister Henry Kosgey and Agriculture minister Sally Kosgei – against Mr Ruto. Mr Odinga may even pick one of the two his running mate.

This could likely doom Mr Ruto’s political career. So, this is the question – is Mr Ruto willing to become Mr Kenyatta’s sacrificial lamb? Can his hatred for Mr Odinga trump his instincts for political survival? Or will his mortal fear of The Hague drive him irrevocably into Mr Kenyatta’s vice-like iron grip?

I can see why Mr Kenyatta sees a Uhuru-Ruto ticket as a plausible strategy out of the ICC and a roadblock against an Odinga presidency.

Except it isn’t. I think it’s more like a suicide pact. Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto shouldn’t act as though they are guilty of crimes against humanity unless they believe they are.

That’s why the better strategy is to drop their presidential bids and first clear their names at the ICC. A strategy driven by fear suggests less faith in their innocence. It smacks of a desperate all-or-nothing strategy for survival.

Makau Mutua is Dean and SUNY Distinguished Professor at SUNY Buffalo Law School and Chair of the KHRC

Why are journalists being denied access to the ‘liberated’ Kismayu?

Monday
December 3, 2012

Opinion

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Rasna Warah

By RASNA WARAH
Posted Sunday, December 2 2012 at 20:00

In Summary

There are no media briefings about the situation in Kismayu; even the military’s articulate spokesperson, Cyrus Oguna, appears to have gone on leave
Last month, Al Jazeera correspondent Peter Greste was holed up at Kismayu’s airport for three days because the so-called interim administration there would not allow him to enter the city
Some media organisations have suggested that the denial of media access to Kismayu might have something to do with the lucrative charcoal trade that sustained Al-Shabaab when it controlled the city
At the heart of the tussle about the charcoal is the question of who controls Kismayu and the larger Jubaland region

After nearly a year of regaling the media with success stories about their incursion into southern Somalia, the Kenya Defence Forces seem to have suddenly gone silent now that they have reached their prize target — the port city of Kismayu.

There are no media briefings about the situation in Kismayu; even the military’s articulate spokesperson, Cyrus Oguna, appears to have gone on leave.

Not only does the world know little about the goings-on in Kismayu, but it seems that the Kenyan forces, along with their Somali counterparts, the Raas Kamboni militia, which helped eject Al Shabaab from the city, are preventing journalists from entering the city.

Last month, Al Jazeera correspondent Peter Greste was holed up at Kismayu’s airport for three days because the so-called interim administration there would not allow him to enter the city.

Greste, writing for his blog from the airport noted: “Kismayu has been an elusive story, ever since the Kenyan military successfully pushed Al-Shabaab out.”

Some media organisations have suggested that the denial of media access to Kismayu might have something to do with the lucrative charcoal trade that sustained Al-Shabaab when it controlled the city.

The nearly four million sacks of charcoal (worth millions of dollars) found in Kismayu by the Kenyan and Somali forces have become a political issue, with Kenya-led forces insisting that they should be exported, and the government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed saying a UN ban on its export should remain and no decision should be made until there is a proper administration in Kismayu.

However, according to The Economist, despite the ban, a dozen or so ships carrying charcoal have already sailed from the port.

It is not clear who is in charge of the port or which authority collected taxes from the exports; The Economist believes the port is run by “a chaotic security committee on which Kenyan, Ethiopian and several competing Somali clan factions all joust”, but no journalist, as far as I know, has met this committee.

At the heart of the tussle about the charcoal is the question of who controls Kismayu and the larger Jubaland region.

The Kenyan and Raas Kamboni leadership, backed by the Ethiopia-dominated Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), appear to be pushing for a semi-autonomous Jubaland state that would be largely independent of the central government.

President Mohamed, however, says his government should play a role in the region’s administration.

Unfortunately, the positions of both sides may create conditions for another conflict. Many Somalis are suspicious of the motives of Kenya and Ethiopia, countries seen to be creating a proxy state. Some are even calling for the deployment of Ugandan troops to Kismayu and withdrawal of Kenyan forces.

Journalist and researcher Abdi Aynte believes there is a middle-ground solution to the impasse. In a recent article, he argued for the formation of a two-year interim administration in Kismayu, led by Kenya-backed Raas Kamboni. On its part, Raas Kamboni should merge its militia with the Somali National Army.

This, he says, would allow the central government to control security in the region, while Raas Kamboni would take charge of the regional administration. Failure to achieve common ground over the administration of Kismayu would spell disaster for Somalia.

In the last two decades, various factions have sought to control the capital of Somalia’s richest and most fertile region because the region and the port were seen as lucrative revenue earners.

Kismayu has also been the port of choice for smugglers bringing in goods that invariably find their way into neighbouring Kenya.

Aynte warns that those seeking to control Kismayu should tread carefully as it has been “the graveyard of many Somali powers”, including Al Shabaab.

Preventing journalists from reporting from Kismayu only adds to the mistrust brewing between the so-called Jubalanders and the new central government, whose delegation was recently turned away from the airport by the forces controlling the city.

rasna.warah@gmail.com