Thursday, 23 June 2011
The rise of China continues as the US distracts itself in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the open-ended “war on terror.” (Illustration courtesy of Martin Kozlowski)
It makes sense to begin with the big picture. In historical perspective, there is reason to expect a clash between today’s dominant power and its putative rival. That configuration has led to direct conflict at every historical juncture except one – the transition from pax Britannica to American predominance. That exception is generally understood in terms of unique affinities and few differences over core interests. The latter had something to do with geography.
A simple extrapolation of the logic at work in other eras points to a Sino-American contest for being “king of the hill.” Such a rough comparison is inadequate, though. For all other things in the equation are not equal. What has changed in the world is the twin phenomena of deep economic interdependence and material well-being reaching at the apex of peoples’ wants and desires. The apparent correlation of the latter with internal political liberalization offers further encouragement that a status /power sharing arrangement might be arrived at without bloodshed or other nasty confrontations.
This, of course, is pure Kant – not just as a superimposed intellectual construct but a logic supported by actual developments in the world we inhabit. A very large segment of world affairs, defined both sectorally and geographically, does represent a partial reification of the Kantian vision, objectively speaking. American strategic attitudes toward China for the past two decades have followed this logic and have been grounded on that perceived reality.
It is a bet of historic dimensions made for high stakes – the future stability of the international system. To state its underlying precepts simply, they are: (1) economic development roughly along free market lines brings with it an attendant political liberalization, even if the lag time is unknowable; (2) countries whose political system makes leaders accountable to the populace – preferably directly, possibly indirectly too – are likely to be peaceable in their external relation; (3) countries that place the greatest importance on economic well-being are less likely to be aggressive because of both the financial costs and, above all, the disruption of the fruitful economic ties across national borders; and (4) therefore, the more extensively China, and its economy, can be enmeshed in global markets and multilateral institutions for maintaining them, the better the prospects that China’s mounting power will not manifest itself in military actions or expansionist, empire building projects generally.
The United States, at the same time, has kept a strong military presence in the Pacific and East Asia so as to reinforce this logic by maintaining disincentives for aggressive behavior. This containment component of American strategy aims to remove temptation, e.g. South Korea and Japan, and to create an existential counterforce to any Chinese illicit ambitions. Taiwan, needless to say, is the most ticklish issue. Sooner or later, China expects its integration with the mainland in some form or other. The question is whether the larger strategic context will induce China to extend the time frame and loosen the notion of what integration means.
Even an optimistic view of Chinese power/influence progression cannot elide the many places and instances where there will be frictions. It is worthwhile to delineate them. Before doing so, it is useful to highlight a couple of features of Sino-American relations that will be omnipresent background factors. By far the most significant is that China is now and, as far as the eye can see, will be the United States’ creditor. The latter’s chronic budget deficits, trade deficits and currency value can only be managed with China’s benign assistance. It is incontrovertibly true that mutual dependence on stable global finance creates something of an economic Mutual Assured Destruction situation. Nonetheless, this pronounced asymmetry cannot fail to exercise some constraint on American behavior toward China. For there are easy ways by which China’s action in the financial realm could generate immediate pressures on the American economy. The psychological effect, barely visible today, can be expected to grow down the road.
The second background factor derives from history. China traditionally has not been in the empire building business. China’s expansion over the centuries has been largely towards the West as an extension of its continual struggle against various “barbarian” threats. (Its occupation of Tonkin for the first millennium of the modern era is the outstanding exception, as are the two half-hearted, failed invasions of Burma and Vietnam under the Ming). It feels neither compulsion to achieve glory nor confirmation of its national mission by controlling directly other places and peoples.
China matches the United States in the depth of its belief in its own exceptionality. Historically, China as Heaven’s Middle Kingdom was felt to stand at the summit of earthly attainments. There is a basic difference between the two countries’ self image, however. The United States’ sense of exceptionality and uniqueness is closely tied to its sense of mission as model and agent of world progress. Others are presumed to emulate the United States in aspiring to its achievements. The Chinese by contrast have no sense of mission. After all, to their way of thinking, no other people is capable of matching them. This may be a good thing in that there is no inevitable clash between two proselytizing nations.
Against this background, here is a notation of foreseeable points of friction that one can envisage.
• Resource conflicts – especially over dwindling energy supplies. Consequences are already evident in Central Asia, Iran and the Gulf, Africa, and the South China Sea where politics intersects economics. Less charged competition for minerals is also evident.
• Multilateral interventions for humanitarian, peacekeeping or peacemaking missions.
• International monetary matters. Recent Chinese initiatives are the harbinger are more serious efforts to reduce the role of the dollar as the international transaction and reserve currency of choice.
• Power shares in multinational organizations – above all the International Monetary Fund for reasons indicated above.
Perhaps the greatest challenge the United States faces is the diplomatic one. This refers not only to direct dealings with China but also dealings with those issues where China will be a party one way or another. That means most matters of consequence. Incorporating the diplomatic factor into its foreign policy making never has been an American forte – especially where it does not control the field of action. Washington is strongly inclined to take its own counsel, to make judgments and then declare its policy with the expectation that most will see the virtue of how it approaches affairs and what it want to do about it. Consider policy-making on Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Contrast it to policy-making on Iran where the slighting of others is a big liability and where the United States has encountered difficulty in orchestrating an international strategy.
In short, China already is beginning to change just about everything.
(Professor Michael Brenner teaches at the University of Texas at Austin, and at the University of Pittsburgh. He can be reached at: mbren@pitt.edu)
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