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Saturday, 03 March 2012 18:11 |
By Evarist Kagaruki When, in early 2009, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed became Somalia’s second interim president, succeeding Abdullahi Yusuf, to head the fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG), he made lofty promises to his fellow citizens. The principal one was that he would strive to reunite the country, bring peace and open a bright new chapter in Somali history. How he could deliver on this pledge in the face of the huge challenges he, like his predecessor, faced was mind-boggling. Since the rise of Al-Shabaab, following the fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which controlled Mogadishu for six months until it was ousted by the Ethiopian military, backing up the TFG, the insurgents have put up a spirited fight against the government and African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops. And, lately, the Islamist fighters also found themselves battling the Kenyan and Ethiopian forces. With Sheikh Ahmed at the helm in Mogadishu, some observers had hoped that the war against the militants would be “swiftly won” because the commander-in-chief would be fighting the enemy he knew very well (many al-Shabaab fighters were part of the Sha’ria courts movement the president once led). It was argued that President Ahmed knew, for example, that there were internal rifts within al Shabaab, which he would widen and exploit to the TFG’s advantage; and that he believed there were many “opportunistic” young fighters in the group whom he could easily woo to his side. That, not surprisingly, has not been the case. And the reason is simply that Sheikh Ahmed was presiding over the same beleaguered government that, for all the eight years of its existence, has been devoid of legitimacy – a government consisting of a bunch of clan warlords born of the politics of expediency anchored in the US strategic interests in the Horn of African region. Besides, most of those in al-Shabaab see the president as a “traitor”. When Ethiopia withdrew her military support to the Somali government in December 2008 it left the legitimacy question un-resolved, and the TFG vulnerable to al-Shabaab’s offensive in several parts of the country. But the militants, who initially enjoyed strong grassroots support, were soon to lose ground due to two serious mistakes, which they made. One was their decision to kill any Somali who did not subscribe to their ideology. This turned most Somalis off. And the other was their attack on Kenya, which caused Nairobi to launch war against them inside Somali territory. These mistakes seem to have worked well to the advantage of the TFG which may now be secure in the fact that al-Shabaab was on the verge of defeat. But, after the militants have been defeated what next? The recent conference on Somalia, held in London, courtesy of the British government, failed to address this crucial question. Having remained passive spectators since the October 1993 debacle of a bungled US “humanitarian” operation in Somalia, the Western countries decided, late last month, to come together to launch a robust collaborative diplomatic and political response to the al-Shaab menace in terms of promises to provide material and financial assistance to the Somali government and AMISOM to bolster their fighting capability. That was ok! But, if the conference was serious about resolving the Somali problem it should have gone a step further and laid down specific coherent plans on how to deal with the aftermath of the war – how to re-establish the Somali state and stabilize the country after 21 years of violence. There are, for example, issues of security (after the foreign troops have withdrawn), resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced, exercising administrative control of liberated areas and reconstruction. The failure of the London meeting to address these and other core issues of the Somali conflict emphasizes the need for another broad-based conference (of national reconciliation) under the auspices of the UN, which would focus on a number of things, including: disarming all militias and an agenda for putting in place a credible interim government (representing all groups, including al-Shabaab) to prepare a Constitution that would lead Somalia to democratic elections, legitimacy, peace, stability and progress. Add this page to your favorite Social Bookmarking websites |
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