Saturday, 09 April 2011
Civil unrest in the Middle East which led to the toppling of decades old leaders has left analysts wondering what type of governments to expect next. (File photo)
Certainly “all’s well that ends well.” Currently, however, all’s not well in the Middle East. There is lack of clarity on how long it will be before political turmoil ends and, more importantly, how meaningfully different the end-result will be.
The last three months of “leaderless revolutions” in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen have yielded mixed results. While some developments are euphoric, others are depressing; while some encourage optimism, others give reason for pessimism; while some Ben Alis and Mubaraks have been ousted, a few Qaddafis and Salehs still manage to cling on; while “life-long” presidents of republics appeared to be a dying stock, the younger Qaddafis are still fighting to prolong the agony of hereditary succession.
The last three months of “leaderless revolutions” in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen have yielded mixed results. While some developments are euphoric, others are depressing; while some encourage optimism, others give reason for pessimism; while some Ben Alis and Mubaraks have been ousted, a few Qaddafis and Salehs still manage to cling on; while “life-long” presidents of republics appeared to be a dying stock, the younger Qaddafis are still fighting to prolong the agony of hereditary succession.
And while pressure forced out governments in Tunisia and Egypt, credible alternatives and replacements are far from becoming the order of the day. While economic woes triggered demand for political change, significant economic relief is unlikely for now or in the foreseeable future; and while the protests were largely homegrown political movements, international actors have dented and discredited indigenous peoples’ power.
The demand for change has brought one reality to the fore—behind the relative quiet for decades, Middle Eastern societies are highly politicized. In the first decade of the 21st century, the Middle East has witnessed several colourful revolutions and umpteen “days of rage.” In such a milieu, reform, constitutional monarchy, political participation, elections, human rights, media freedom, equitable distribution of wealth, accountability and transparency, among others, are now likely to remain overt buzzwords. Attempts to close a lid on them are unlikely to be easy anymore.
The demand for change has brought one reality to the fore—behind the relative quiet for decades, Middle Eastern societies are highly politicized. In the first decade of the 21st century, the Middle East has witnessed several colourful revolutions and umpteen “days of rage.” In such a milieu, reform, constitutional monarchy, political participation, elections, human rights, media freedom, equitable distribution of wealth, accountability and transparency, among others, are now likely to remain overt buzzwords. Attempts to close a lid on them are unlikely to be easy anymore.
What is baffling is why it took so long for this outburst of anger despite the history of revolutions, coups and government ousters in the region. It will, indeed, be interesting to observe if people will again become complacent following this explosion of their pent-up fury and partial realisation of their goals. Will they again take a backseat in the hope that a change at the top will yield transformation in the middle and bottom, both politically and economically? Or, will they device new ways of sustaining the momentum in order to protect their recent gains?
As much as getting rid of the existing political dispensation offers temporary relief, it does not address the core problems of the aggrieved. It is crucial, therefore, to reflect on how to translate their aspirations into reality by installing a credible alternative in an otherwise gigantic political vacuum. It is important to remember that Iran got rid of monarchy, only to be replaced by religious conservatism; and that the US-led coalition ousted Saddam Hussein without a sensible transition plan for Iraq.
According to a Carnegie Endowment report, the “new” regimes in Egypt and Tunisia are “seemingly determined to curb the pro-democracy momentum generated so far. A change in ruling elites and system of governance is still a distant goal.” It is either this or people’s apathy or utter transitional confusion that limited the turnout in Egyptian referendum for constitutional change in March to a mere 41 percent of the 45 million eligible voters. It surely broke all records for recent elections, as claimed by government officials, but there is no doubting that it is still an abysmally low number for a three-decade-long movement in a democracy-starved country.
It will also be equally interesting to see if these events will serve as a lesson for other governments to reinvent their political systems. If ever governments were waiting for an opportunity to undertake reform based on “domestic realities,” it is now. If ever there was a time for introspection about the wisdom of political evolution over revolution—both from the governments’ and people’s perspectives—it is now.
The fundamental difference between change through evolution and revolution is evident–the endgame of the former is better than the fallout of the latter. Even if they do not become anything close to resembling conventional democracies, the region’s governments should certainly see reason to move further from where they are today.
This reiterates the delicate economic-political link, which the Gulf countries have mastered. Repression is rarely the reason behind the relative political calm in this sub-region; it is welfare-ism that has helped them achieve the subtle equilibrium. What all this also points to is that the nature of “governance” is more important than the form of “government.”
In terms of immediate economic impact, the political movements have been more detrimental than beneficial, both for the economies of the concerned countries in the region and the world at large.
It is common knowledge that every time any part of the Middle East sneezes, the oil market catches flu, leading to considerable rise in oil price. Despite the current round of unrest being limited to mostly non-oil exporting states, except Libya, the fear of it spreading elsewhere has created enough panic and speculation to depress “premature” signs of global economic recovery, especially in the West.
If oil prices continue to remain high or rise further, hope of any real and eventual global recovery could be in danger. According to a World Bank assessment, for every 50 percent increase in the price of oil, global economic growth is expected to diminish by 1.5 percent.
More cause for worry is the chain reaction that high oil prices will engender in already increasing food prices. This is bad news not only for robust economies and those posting modest growth, but also for those struggling. Even more importantly, this will not be good news for much of the Middle East, where economic despair triggered the current turbulence.
The International Monetary Fund, anticipating unsustainable and populist economic measures to quell the reigning unrest, has suggested that there will be tighter credit restrictions for regional governments and corporations. Lending by banks is also likely to remain damp in the foreseeable future, thereby hurting the chances of tackling social problems, including mounting unemployment.
As much as some countries have claimed that protests are “a democratic way of doing things” and that “investors are not worried,” business sentiments will no doubt be affected, with confidence in the region’s hotspots remaining low. The end of “stabilized” dictatorial rule has ironically yielded more uncertainty and instability, which is keeping the markets nervous. As a result, bourses will not exactly be buzzing with activity in the near term; and new development projects, tourism as well as foreign direct investment are bound to suffer setbacks in the short to medium term.
In the long term, the economic recovery and restoration of investor confidence largely depends on whether or not—and how soon—political and economic reforms demanded by the people translate into policies on the ground.
If political changes indeed take effect and translate into economic reforms, opportunities would obviously grow for both domestic and international businesses. This, in the domestic scenario, would encourage the growth of a vibrant middle class, which is a vital component of any aspiring democratic system.
Finally, it is true that there is usually “no fire without a spark.” Equally important, however, is the fuel behind the fire. The young street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi’s spark in Tunisia has, no doubt, triggered an unprecedented crisis in the Middle East. But the current unrest represents a trial balloon. How it flies will determine how many more, where, and what kind, of revolutionary balloons will take off in the region.
The combined result will ultimately determine if this is a “new” Middle East. Till then, it is better off designated as “old Middle East in a new bottle.”
(Dr. N. Janardhan is a UAE-based political analyst, and author of “Boom Amid Gloom: The Spirit of Possibility in the 21st Century Gulf” (Ithaca Press), scheduled to be released in mid-2011.)
As much as getting rid of the existing political dispensation offers temporary relief, it does not address the core problems of the aggrieved. It is crucial, therefore, to reflect on how to translate their aspirations into reality by installing a credible alternative in an otherwise gigantic political vacuum. It is important to remember that Iran got rid of monarchy, only to be replaced by religious conservatism; and that the US-led coalition ousted Saddam Hussein without a sensible transition plan for Iraq.
According to a Carnegie Endowment report, the “new” regimes in Egypt and Tunisia are “seemingly determined to curb the pro-democracy momentum generated so far. A change in ruling elites and system of governance is still a distant goal.” It is either this or people’s apathy or utter transitional confusion that limited the turnout in Egyptian referendum for constitutional change in March to a mere 41 percent of the 45 million eligible voters. It surely broke all records for recent elections, as claimed by government officials, but there is no doubting that it is still an abysmally low number for a three-decade-long movement in a democracy-starved country.
It will also be equally interesting to see if these events will serve as a lesson for other governments to reinvent their political systems. If ever governments were waiting for an opportunity to undertake reform based on “domestic realities,” it is now. If ever there was a time for introspection about the wisdom of political evolution over revolution—both from the governments’ and people’s perspectives—it is now.
The fundamental difference between change through evolution and revolution is evident–the endgame of the former is better than the fallout of the latter. Even if they do not become anything close to resembling conventional democracies, the region’s governments should certainly see reason to move further from where they are today.
This reiterates the delicate economic-political link, which the Gulf countries have mastered. Repression is rarely the reason behind the relative political calm in this sub-region; it is welfare-ism that has helped them achieve the subtle equilibrium. What all this also points to is that the nature of “governance” is more important than the form of “government.”
In terms of immediate economic impact, the political movements have been more detrimental than beneficial, both for the economies of the concerned countries in the region and the world at large.
It is common knowledge that every time any part of the Middle East sneezes, the oil market catches flu, leading to considerable rise in oil price. Despite the current round of unrest being limited to mostly non-oil exporting states, except Libya, the fear of it spreading elsewhere has created enough panic and speculation to depress “premature” signs of global economic recovery, especially in the West.
If oil prices continue to remain high or rise further, hope of any real and eventual global recovery could be in danger. According to a World Bank assessment, for every 50 percent increase in the price of oil, global economic growth is expected to diminish by 1.5 percent.
More cause for worry is the chain reaction that high oil prices will engender in already increasing food prices. This is bad news not only for robust economies and those posting modest growth, but also for those struggling. Even more importantly, this will not be good news for much of the Middle East, where economic despair triggered the current turbulence.
The International Monetary Fund, anticipating unsustainable and populist economic measures to quell the reigning unrest, has suggested that there will be tighter credit restrictions for regional governments and corporations. Lending by banks is also likely to remain damp in the foreseeable future, thereby hurting the chances of tackling social problems, including mounting unemployment.
As much as some countries have claimed that protests are “a democratic way of doing things” and that “investors are not worried,” business sentiments will no doubt be affected, with confidence in the region’s hotspots remaining low. The end of “stabilized” dictatorial rule has ironically yielded more uncertainty and instability, which is keeping the markets nervous. As a result, bourses will not exactly be buzzing with activity in the near term; and new development projects, tourism as well as foreign direct investment are bound to suffer setbacks in the short to medium term.
In the long term, the economic recovery and restoration of investor confidence largely depends on whether or not—and how soon—political and economic reforms demanded by the people translate into policies on the ground.
If political changes indeed take effect and translate into economic reforms, opportunities would obviously grow for both domestic and international businesses. This, in the domestic scenario, would encourage the growth of a vibrant middle class, which is a vital component of any aspiring democratic system.
Finally, it is true that there is usually “no fire without a spark.” Equally important, however, is the fuel behind the fire. The young street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi’s spark in Tunisia has, no doubt, triggered an unprecedented crisis in the Middle East. But the current unrest represents a trial balloon. How it flies will determine how many more, where, and what kind, of revolutionary balloons will take off in the region.
The combined result will ultimately determine if this is a “new” Middle East. Till then, it is better off designated as “old Middle East in a new bottle.”
(Dr. N. Janardhan is a UAE-based political analyst, and author of “Boom Amid Gloom: The Spirit of Possibility in the 21st Century Gulf” (Ithaca Press), scheduled to be released in mid-2011.)
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